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DEMOCRATIZING CAPITAL: THE HISTORY, LAW, AND
REFORM OF THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACTt
RicHARD D. MARSICO*
The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 ("CRA") I has made
great progress in achieving its dual purposes: eliminating bank red-
lining2 and promoting reinvestment in previously redlined neigh-
borhoods. In doing so, the CRA has helped to democratize capital
by giving more people a voice in bank lending decisions and includ-
ing more people in the economic mainstream by influencing banks
to make more loans to buy homes or open small businesses. De-
spite the CRA's success, the CRA has not reached its full potential.
One of the main reasons for this is that the federal agencies that
enforce the CRA are so fearful of allocating credit that they use
vague and subjective criteria for evaluating bank lending, making it
difficult to hold a bank accountable for a poor lending record or
even to know what constitutes a poor lending record. In order for
the CRA to reach its full potential, objective and quantitative crite-
ria for evaluating a bank's CRA performance must be implemented.
Such criteria will maximize both the public's voice in decisions
about bank lending and the number of people who receive loans.
t This paper is a modified version of the introduction to the author's
forthcoming book, DEMOCRATIZING CAPITAL: THE HISTORY, LAw, AND REFORM OF THE
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT (reprinted with the permission of Carolina Academic
Press).
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. J.D. Harvard Law School, 1985; B.A.
Fordham University, 1982. The author wishes to thank New York Law School for its
generous support of the research that made this work possible.
1. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908 (2000).
2. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1283 (7th ed. 1999) ("[Redlining is] credit dis-
crimination (usually unlawful discrimination) by a financial institution that refuses to
make loans on properties in allegedly bad neighborhoods."); GLENN B. CANNER, REDLIN-
ING: RESEARCH AND FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE I n.2 (Board of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys. Staff Study No. 121, 1982); Katherine L. Bradbury et al., Geographic
Patterns of Mortgage Lending in Boston, 1982-1987, NEW ENG. ECON. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1989,
at 3.
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I. THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT AND ITS EFFECT ON
DEMOCRATIZING CAPITAL
The CRA imposes on banks a "continuing and affirmative obli-
gation to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in
which they are chartered, '3 including low- and moderate-income
("LMI") neighborhoods. 4 The purpose of the CRA is twofold.
First, Congress intended the CRA to end the banking practice
known as redlining, by which banks would refuse to lend in certain
neighborhoods, especially older and inner-city neighborhoods and
neighborhoods whose residents were predominantly minority or
low-income. Second, the CRA was to encourage banks to lend
more in redlined neighborhoods.
The CRA places enforcement of a bank's obligation to meet
the credit needs of its local community in the hands of four federal
administrative agencies that regulate banks (the "federal banking
agencies" or the "agencies"). 5 The CRA requires these agencies to
examine each bank periodically to determine whether it is helping
to meet community credit needs, to issue a written public report -
including a rating - evaluating the bank's CRA performance, and
to take the bank's CRA record into account when deciding whether
3. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a) (3).
4. Id. at § 2903(a) (1).
5. The four federal banking agencies that enforce the CRA are the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System ("Federal Reserve"), the Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency ("OCC"), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"),
and the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS"). See 12 U.S.C. § 2902(1). Each agency
regulates a different type of bank and all the agencies have adopted virtually identical
CRA regulations with one major exception. On August 18, 2004, the OTS announced a
significant departure from the other agencies' regulations. It adopted a regulation that
changed the definition of a small bank for CRA evaluative purposes from a bank with
less than $250 million in assets to a bank with less than $1 billion in assets. See Commu-
nity Reinvestment Act Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 51,115 (Aug. 18, 2004) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 563e). The agencies, the banks they regulate, and their CRA regula-
tions are:
AGENCY JURISDICTION REGULATIONS
OCC National banks 12 C.F.R. pt. 25 (2003)
Federal Reserve State-chartered banks that are members 12 C.F.R. pt. 228 (2003)
of the Federal Reserve System
FDIC State-chartered banks that are not 12 C.F.R. pt. 345 (2003)
members of the Federal Reserve System
OTS Savings and loans 12 C.F.R. pt. 563e (2004)
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to grant certain bank applications to expand their business. 6 When
a bank files one of these expansion applications, any member of the
public may file comments with the federal banking agency that reg-
ulates the bank opposing the application on the basis that the bank
has failed to meet its CRA obligations.
One of the CRA's unique contributions has been to "democra-
tize capital." It has done so in two ways. The first may be analo-
gized to voting. The CRA has democratized decisions about the
distribution of capital by extending at least part of the decisionmak-
ing "franchise" to previously "disenfranchised" people, in particular
low-income and minority persons. 7 Second, the CRA has played a
role in distributing loans to people - particularly low-income and
minority individuals - who previously did not receive loans, thus
including them in the economic mainstream and giving them the
same economic opportunity as others.8 The CRA has done this by
influencing banks to make loans to low-income and minority indi-
viduals to purchase, refinance, or improve a home; to open or ex-
pand a small business; or to support a small farm.
By democratizing capital, the CRA has made great progress in
eliminating redlining and promoting reinvestment in redlined
neighborhoods. Despite the federal banking agencies' record of
weak CRA enforcement, there is substantial evidence that supports
the conclusion that the CRA has encouraged banks to lend more
money to LMI and minority persons and neighborhoods than they
would have without the CRA. The opportunity for disenfranchised
6. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901(b), 2903(a) (2), and 2906.
7. See GREGORY D. SQUIRES, CAPITAL AND COMMUNITIES IN BLACK AND WHITE 69
(1994) ("More importantly, the law created organizing opportunities for community
groups to influence mortgage lending policies of private financial institutions."); JOHN
TAYLOR & JOSH SILVER, The Essential Role of Activism in Community Reinvestment, in OR-
GANIZING ACCESS TO CAPITAL: ADVOCACY AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF FINANCIAL INSTI-
TUTIONS 169, 173 (Gregory D. Squires ed., 2003) (The CRA "has created a democratic
dialogue between community groups and banks. It mandates that banks meet the
credit needs of all the communities in which they are chartered and from which they
take deposits. Ultimately, the only way banks can do this is to listen as communities
articulate their credit needs."); Donald A. Lash, The Community Development Banking Act
and the Evaluation of Credit Allocation Policies, 7J. AFF. HoUs. 385, 398 (1998) (describing
the early twentieth century movement to "democratize credit").
8. See TAYLOR & SILVER, supra note 7, at 182 ("The CRA achieves higher loans and
investments for traditionally underserved communities through a process of informa-
tion sharing, evaluation, debate, and compromise.").
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members of redlined neighborhoods to comment on a bank's CRA
record when it files an expansion application has given them a pow-
erful voice in decisions about the distribution of loans.9 Banks,
which are generally sensitive to bad publicity and risk-averse in their
expansion applications, are anxious to have good CRA records both
as good public relations and to ensure approval of their expansion
applications. Public comments, and the delay and risk they cause to
bank expansion plans, have brought banks to the bargaining table
with community groups resulting in bank pledges to lend more
than one trillion dollars to LMI and predominantly minority neigh-
borhoods nationwide.10 Even if banks do not have expansion plans
in the immediate future, their desire for good public relations,
their discovery that CRA-related lending can be profitable, and
their desire to prevent comments opposing future expansion appli-
cations have motivated banks to change their lending practices, in-
troduce new loan products, and partner with community groups to
make lending to LMI and minority persons and neighborhoods
part of their business strategies.
Despite its success in democratizing capital, the CRA has not
reached its full potential. For example, there remains a dispropor-
tionate distribution of subprime mortgage lending - mortgage
loans at higher interest rates with more onerous payment terms
than prime mortgage loans - in LMI and predominantly minority
neighborhoods. There is also evidence that many recipients of sub-
prime loans could have received cheaper prime loans. Addition-
ally, a disproportionate percentage of low-income persons do not
participate in the banking system.
II. THE REASON THE CRA HAS NOT REACHED ITS FULL POTENTIAL
There are several reasons the CRA has not reached its full po-
tential for democratizing capital. One of the main reasons is that
the federal banking agencies that enforce the CRA utilize subjective
criteria for evaluating the CRA performance of banks. Such criteria
limit the power of the franchise the CRA extends to LMI and mi-
nority persons and the amount of capital they receive because sub-
9. See TAYLOR & SILVER, supra note 7, at 171.
10. See NATIONAL COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT COALITION, CRA COMMITMENTS 1997-
1998.
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jective criteria make it difficult to hold a bank accountable for a
poor CRA record or to adequately determine a bank's capacity for
lending. In contrast, quantitative and objective criteria for evaluat-
ing CRA performance would help maximize the CRA's potential.
The reason the agencies have failed to adopt quantitative and ob-
jective criteria is their fear that such standards would allocate
credit. The CRA's legislative history makes clear that Congress did
not intend the CRA to allocate credit, and the agencies fear credit
allocation could lead to unsafe and unsound banking practices.
Although Congress passed the CRA to end redlining and to
influence banks to make loans to previously redlined neighbor-
hoods, Congress also stated that it did not intend the CRA to allo-
cate credit; another way of stating that the CRA was not to be used
to create lending quotas. Congress did not ban quotas, but the leg-
islative history indicates that quotas are not permissible under the
CRA.
Reflecting its legislative history, the CRA is designed to influ-
ence banks to lend more money in underserved neighborhoods
without allocating credit. A bank's CRA obligation to help meet
community credit needs is enforced by periodic regulatory evalua-
tions of the bank's CRA record, public disclosure of information
about the bank's CRA record, and CRA-related scrutiny of the
bank's expansion applications. The CRA does not, however, con-
tain enforcement provisions that might lead to credit allocation,
such as mandatory penalties for a bank that fails to satisfy its CRA
obligations or a private right of action for individuals harmed as a
result of CRA violations.
In the first CRA enforcement regime, which lasted from 1978
through mid-1997 when new CRA regulations replaced the original
regulations, the federal banking agencies - all of whom had op-
posed the CRA - did not emphasize the portion of the CRA or its
legislative history that focused on increasing lending to redlined
neighborhoods. Instead, they focused on the portion of the legisla-
tive history that prohibited credit allocation. The agencies treated
the CRA as a law that was intended to correct an information fail-
ure in the market. According to this theory, banks redlined be-
cause they decided it was not worth the expense or time to seek
creditworthy borrowers in particular neighborhoods, especially
2004]
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LMI, inner-city, or predominantly minority communities. The
agencies' perspective was that the CRA requires banks to seek infor-
mation about lending opportunities in redlined neighborhoods
and market loans there. The first set of CRA regulations, which
were in force from 1978 through mid-1997, reflected this position.
The criteria for evaluating CRA performance under these regula-
tions and the agencies' enforcement of the CRA emphasized the
efforts a bank undertook to make loans in its local community. A
bank's actual lending was of secondary importance to its efforts to
lend. When the agencies evaluated bank lending, they used vague
and inconsistent criteria and subjective standards that made it im-
possible for members of the public to know what a bank's CRA obli-
gations were, let alone hold a bank to them.
Over time, the first CRA enforcement regime generated great
dissatisfaction. The regime had the unfortunate distinction of gen-
erating dissension among the banks it regulated, the residents of
redlined neighborhoods that it was intended to benefit, and the
law's enforcers - the federal banking agencies themselves." They
all agreed that the CRA was enforced in an arbitrary and inconsis-
tent manner. Bankers complained that it generated unnecessary
burden and paperwork, and subjected bank expansion plans to un-
due delay and expense. Community groups asserted that the fed-
eral banking agencies did not fulfill their responsibility to enforce
the CRA and that the criteria they used for evaluating bank lending
11. Community Reinvestment Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions
& Consumer Credit of the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 104th Cong. 148
(1995) (statement of Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency) ("[N]o other set of bank regulations was so universally criticized by bankers
and customers than these regulations, criticized precisely because they created needless
burdens on the one hand and failed to fulfill the promise of the Community Reinvest-
ment Act on the other."), reprinted in 14 OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY
Q.J. No. 2 at 37 (June 1995); Existing Efforts to End the Crisis: A Report Card: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Consumer Credit and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance &
Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 55 (1993) (statement of Lawrence B. Lindsey, Member, Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), reprinted in 79 FED. RES. BULL. 285 (1993);
Plans and Progress to Date of Interagency CRA Regulatory Reform Effort: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on General Oversight, Investigations, & the Resolution of Failed Financial Institutions
of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance & Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 36 (1993) (statement
of Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency), re-
printed in 12 OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY Q.J. No. 4 at 27 (Dec. 1993);
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT: CHALLENGES REMAIN TO
SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENT CRA 5 (Nov. 1995).
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were too vague and subjective to allow them to hold a bank ac-
countable for a poor record of meeting community credit needs.
In response to the many criticisms of the first CRA enforce-
ment regime, the federal banking agencies began a rulemaking
process in July 1993 that culminated in new CRA regulations in
April 1995. These rules were fully phased in byJuly 1997. The new
regulations made some improvements and some progress towards
implementing objective and quantitative criteria for evaluating the
CRA performance of a bank. Specifically, the second set of CRA
regulations eliminated the criteria that evaluated bank efforts and
replaced them with criteria that evaluated a bank's lending, invest-
ment, and service performance. The regulations require the fed-
eral banking agencies to consider the extent of the bank's lending
in its community, the geographic distribution of its loans, and its
lending to persons of different income levels. However, the regula-
tions do not contain objective and quantitative criteria for measur-
ing bank lending and community credit needs, or evaluating
whether the lending meets credit needs. Thus, despite the im-
provement, the regulations fall short of fulfilling the capital-democ-
ratizing promise of the CRA.
The first proposed draft of the new regulations, however, came
very close to utilizing objective and quantitative criteria for evaluat-
ing the CRA performance of a bank. It had a "market share" test,
which would have evaluated a bank's record of meeting community
credit needs by comparing a bank's market share of loans in LMI
neighborhoods with its overall market share of loans. There was
also a loan-to-deposit ratio ("LDR") test, pursuant to which the per-
centage of a bank's deposits that it returned to the community in
the form of loans would be compared with an ideal 65% LDR. Fi-
nally, the regulations evaluated the percentage of a bank's loans in
its community. If a majority of loans were in the bank's community,
this was "appropriate." The banking industry criticized the market
share and LDR tests as allocating credit, and the federal banking
agencies dropped them from the final regulations.
The failure of the federal banking agencies to adopt CRA regu-
lations that use objective and quantitative criteria for evaluating a
bank's CRA performance means that the CRA still has a long way to
go before reaching its potential for democratizing capital. Despite
20041
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improvements in the second set of CRA regulations, the agencies
continue to enforce the CRA in a way that makes it nearly impossi-
ble for community groups to hold a bank accountable for a poor
lending record. In conducting performance evaluations, the agen-
cies did not use a fixed set of CRA evaluative criteria; frequently
employed criteria consisting of a quantitative measure of bank lend-
ing or a quantitative benchmark of community credit needs, but
used subjective standards to compare bank lending with the bench-
mark; did not define the level of performance required to meet a
particular subjective standard; used the subjective evaluative stan-
dards inconsistently and almost always in a way that favored banks;
and did not define the weight each criterion had. The agencies'
decisions on expansion applications similarly did not use a fixed set
of criteria and used subjective standards for evaluating bank lend-
ing. The decisions generally listed facts about the bank's lending,
emphasized strengths and excused weaknesses, and did not de-
scribe the reasoning the agency employed in reaching the decision.
III. QUANTITATIVE AND OBJECTIVE CRA EVALUATIVE CRITERIA
THAT DO NOT ALLOCATE CREDIT
In contrast to subjective standards for evaluating CRA perform-
ance, a fixed set of objective and quantitative criteria for evaluating
a bank's CRA performance would maximize the CRA's potential for
democratizing capital. Such criteria would make it easier to hold a
bank accountable for a poor CRA record and would more clearly
define how much lending a bank should be doing. Despite the fed-
eral banking agencies' fear of allocating credit with such criteria, it
is possible to use such criteria without allocating credit.
Before describing the criteria, it is helpful to describe in more
detail the difference between allocating credit and influencing
banks to lend. "Allocation" is defined as the act of apportioning
"for specific purposes or to particular persons or organizations," as
in, for example, a governmental or economic control measure.' 2
Based on this definition, "credit allocation" would take the form of
governmental apportioning of bank loans for specific purposes or
to particular persons. In fact, in the CRA's legislative history, CRA's
12. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED 57 (1993).
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opponents equated credit allocation with crelit quotas. Anything
less than a specific apportionment or a quota is not credit alloca-
tion, but an attempt to influence a bank to lend to particular per-
sons. Even if the attempt to influence is a strong one, it is not
credit allocation as long as it is not a specific apportionment or a
quota.
There are several examples of governmental interventions in
the credit markets that help elucidate the difference between allo-
cating credit and attempting to influence banks to lend. As an ex-
ample of credit allocation, the Department of Justice entered into
several consent decrees requiring banks it had accused of violating
the fair lending laws to make specific dollar volumes of loans to
particular neighborhoods or borrowers. In contrast, the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act influences banks to lend to minority and
low-income individuals and neighborhoods by requiring banks to
disclose information about the race and income of their loan appli-
cants and borrowers and the location of their loans. Somewhere in
between consent decrees that allocate credit and laws that influence
banks to lend through disclosure is a law that sets loan purchase
targets for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and a law that sets reinvest-
ment ratios for the out-of-state branches of interstate banks. While
these two laws establish investment and loan targets, the targets are
not quotas. The laws are based on the lenders' own market pres-
ence, the targets are easy to reach, and the penalties for failing to
reach the targets are weak and remote.
Similarly, objective and quantitative criteria for evaluating a
bank's CRA performance can strongly influence banks to lend with-
out allocating credit. Specifically, criteria that compare a bank's
lending record with the entire market and judge a bank to have
satisfied its CRA obligations if it outpaces the market, but not to
have satisfied its CRA obligations if it lags behind the market, influ-
ence banks to lend without allocating credit. For example, criteria
could be established that compare a bank's percentage of loans to
low-income or predominantly minority neighborhoods with the
percentage of such loans by all lenders in the bank's community. If
the bank's percentage is higher, it is meeting the credit needs of
that community. If the bank's percentage is lower, it is not meeting
that community's credit needs. For example, if a bank made 10%
2004]
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of its loans to low-income individuals compared with 15% of loans
to low-income individuals by all lenders in the bank's community,
the bank has failed to meet the credit needs of low-income
individuals.
Such criteria do not allocate credit because they do not set a
quota of loans the bank must make to low-income individuals.
They use the market for loans as a benchmark. The market is not a
quota; it is what it is. While such criteria do not require a bank to
make a certain number of loans, they certainly influence a bank to
make loans in order to ensure that it satisfies its CRA obligations.
Finally, such criteria are objective and quantitative, making it easier
to hold a bank accountable for a poor lending record and to ensure
it is doing its share to meet community credit needs, and will thus
help maximize the CRA's potential for democratizing capital.
